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An Introduction to the Vatican Instruction
on Reproductive Technologies
Joseph Boyle

Pro(essor Boyle. a neH'(r-appoil1led member o(the Linaere Quarterly
editorial advisor!' board and likewise. nell'/r-named book rel'iell' editor, is
a professor ofphilosophr at St . Michael's Col/eKe, Universitr o( Toronto.

I. The Purpose of the Instruction
On Feb . 22, 1987, the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
issued a moral evaluation of various widely discussed reproductive
procedures and related activities. The name of this document is

"Instruction on Respect(or Human Li(e in its Origin and onthe DiKnitr of
Procreat ion: Replies to Certain Questions of/h e Dar". This I nstru ction is
often referred to by the first two words in the official Latin text , "Donum
Vitae ", gift of life.
As its title suggests, the purpose of the I nstruction is to answer certain
"questions of the day" concerning such matters as in vitro fertilization ,
artificial insemination, and the medical treatment ofthe unborn. Thus, the
instruction is not concerned directly with questions of science, nor even
with the underlying technological possibilities created by the developments
of modern biological science, but is concerned with certain human actions
- those in which scientific knowledge and technological possibilities are
used to solve problems of infertility , treat the diseases of the unborn , and
so on. Such uses of scientific knowledge and technology raise serious
moral questions , as virtually everyone admits. It is these moral questions
which the I nstruction addresses.
In fact, the Instruction exhibits a welcoming and grateful attitude not
only toward the great advances in scientific understanding of human
beings, but also toward the technological potent ial which these advances
create. Properly used , this technology can be a great help to human beings
in carrying out their vocations in this world . So there is no suspicio n ofthe
technological or the art ifi cial, just as such, and no nostalgia for natural
ways of, say, reproduction, just because they are natural. If certain medical
procedures are evaluated negatively, it is not because they are artificial, but
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because they fail to properly respect all the persons and human goods
involved.
Moral evaluation of the kind found in the Instruction is common
enough in human life. When carried out by the authorized teachers of the
Church, it has the distinctive character of Christian moral teaching. As
teaching by those especially empowered by Christ to teach, it differs from
ordinary moral evaluation in being more than simply the opinion of one
person or group to be accepted only on the basis of one's estimate of the
merits of the arguments presented. Still, Christian moral teaching is
teaching. It is not giving orders or handing down decrees . It is not, in other
words , like the exercise of legitimate political or legal authority in which
legislators or judges make decisions which others have some duty to obey.
In the case of such decisions , which must be made within the Church as
well as in political society, the issue is not the truth of the decision, but its
wisdom and legitimacy. In the case of moral teaching, by contrast, the
issue is fundamentally one of truth.
That is why the authors of the Instruction proceed as they do. Like
Christian teachers generally, they do not simply issue edicts, but present
moral reasons . They appeal to the vision of human life which is found in
the Scriptures and has been constantly taught within the Church, and
apply it to questions which trouble the faithful and people generally. This
application involves highlighting especially relevant aspects of this vision,
and considering carefully how certain human actions are to be evaluated in
light of them.
So the Instruction is literally that: instruction, teaching. Contrary to the
impressions created by the way the media often characterize Church
teaching, especially about moral questions, the Instruction is not
upholding a ban or issuing a condemnation, but providing a reasoned
evaluation. As such, it is meant to invite reflection. Indeed , in its closing
paragraphs, the Instruction makes explicit this invitation. Proper orders
are to be obeyed, but teaching is to be pondered, understood , and
personally appropriated .
II. The Principles Underlying the Instruction's Teaching

The elements of the Christian vision of human life highlighted in the
Instruction are those relating to the conception of the human person, the
nature of marriage and sexuality, and the sacredness of human life. The
most important of these can be expressed as five propositions which
function as principles for the evaluation of the particular concerns of the
Instruction. First, God makes human individuals in His own image and
likeness , and He is directly involved in the coming-to-be of each new
person. Second , the human person is one being, bodily as well as spiritual,
so bodily life and sexuality may not be treated as mere means to more
fundamental purposes. Third, every living human individual, from the
moment of conception, should be treated with the full respect due a person
and so is inviolable. A human being is always a he or a she, an I or a you ,
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never an object, a mere so mething. Fourth, sexual activity and procreation
can be morally good only if they are part of marital intercourse. Fifth, in
marital intercourse, love-making and life-giving should not be separated.
These principles underlie the Church's teaching concerning all the issues
in sexual morality, bioethics, and respect for human life. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the moral outlook of the I nstruction is identical to that of
"Humanae Vitae," the "Decree on Procured Abortion" and "Familiaris
Consortio". In fact, the Instruction explicitly relies on these and other
recent magisterial statements, eS'pecially those of John Paul II and Pius
XII. All the principles used in the Instruction are to be found in these
earlier magisterial statements where they are much more fully articulated
and defended.
What is distinctive about the Instruction is that it applies these
principles to a related set of current questions which have not been
evaluated before in a systematic and unified manner. Thus, the Instruction
makes use of these principles, but generally does not seek to establish their
truth or demonstrate their special place within the Christian view of
human life. Rather, their truth is reasonably taken for granted as fixed
within the teaching of the Church, knowable by the natural moral law, and
amply explained and defended in recent Church teaching.
It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that one can find in the Instruction
an attempt to persuade those who reject its principles. Since dissenting
theologians and many outside the Church reject at least some of these
principles, it is not surprising that the I nstruction has been found
unpersuasive by many . But that is no criticism of the Instruction. Its task is
to deal with certain questions of the day, not defend, from the ground up,
the entire fabric of Christian ethics as understood within the Church. A
fairer question, then, is whether the Instruction's evaluation of various
procedures is justified by these principles, and by the larger vision of
human life of which they are part. As will become clear, even in this short
overview of the Instruction, the Instruction's evaluations clearly are
justified by this standard.
This is not to suggest that there are no difficulties in understanding the
precise ways in which these principles are applied to the specific actions
evaluated. For example, there is considerable unclarity about how the
principle of the inseparability of the love-making and life-giving aspects of
marital intercourse actually applies to such things as artificial
insemination by husband and in vitro fertilization within marriage.
Further, the I nstruction does contain some argumentation in support of
at least some of its principles, in particular the principle requiring that all
living human individuals be treated as persons from the moment of
conception. The Instruction's argument emphasizes the continuity of the
development of human life from the moment of conception, and , while
recognizing that science cannot by itself resolve all the problems in this
area, and that purely speculative questions about the moment of
ensoulment cannot be definitively settled, concludes that there is an
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indefeasible presumption in favor of the personhood of every living
individual. "How cou ld a human individual not be a human personT'
This argumentat ion seems sound as far as it goes, but g iven the
importance of this principle, not on ly for the Church's overall sanctity of
life stance, but also for the imm ediately relevant question of the status of
the embryo imm ed ia tel y after conception, one might reasonably expect a
more extended and analytical treatment. It se~ms to me that the following
considerations might reasonably be added to what the I nst ruct ion act ually
says. F irst. the only thin g a ll those whom we consider persons have in
common is that they are all hum an indi vidua ls . By what non- arbit rary
crit e ri o n could the newly conceived human individual be excluded from
personal status') Second , there is no doubt that the newly conceived is a
human individual. The possibilities of twinning and mosaics do not s h ow
that th e individuals who can divide or combine are not living human
individuals. Third, medieval theori zi ng about the beginning of life
supposed that life came from non-living materials. Unhampered by this
false v iew, we have no such reason for thinking that the developing
indi v idu al cannot be a person from th e outset.

III. Acts Judged Morally Permissible
The In str uction considers carefull y a number of perplexing questions
concerning the treatment of the unborn. The basic principle used to
eva luat e these matters is that as persons, the unborn deserve the same
moral consideration as other persons. Thus prenatal diagnosis and
treatme nt, including experimental treatment if that is the best one can do,
are permissible if done for the child's benefit under the same conditions as
would appl y for chi ldren already born. Likewise, research , (that is,
observation), upon the unborn is permissible ifit is harmless and done wi th
parental consent.
The sa m e principle is ex te nd ed to deal with the question of the hand ling
of th e co rp ses of the unborn. They are to be treated with the same respect
due any hum a n corpse. Thus, experimentation upon the corpses of the
unborn may be permissible, although under stringent conditions. Experimentation may be permissible upon the corpses of those deliberately
aborted if th e conditions are met. Those conditions are the following: first.
that one be certa in that the individual is dead - that it is a corpse and not a
living person; second, that the consent of the parents or at least the mother
be obta in ed; third , that there be no complicity in deliberate abort io n;
fourth, that scanda l be avoided; and fifth, that human remains not be
bought and so ld .
Closely related to the questions of the treatment of the unborn are
a tt empts to influence inheritance. Such efforts are justified if done for
th erape utic benefit of the person treated, if the usual conditions for
therapy apply, and if the special character of the risks is properly taken
into account.
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The Instruction also deals with technical interventions in the
reproductive process. It finds some of the most familiar of these
unacceptable, but judges morally acceptable those interventions which
facilitate the performance of the marital act and those which enable the
marital act to be fruitful. The I nstruction does not say exactly what these
procedures are, but the genj::ral idea is both important and clear:
interventions which do not replace or substitute for the marital act as the
human activity which brings forth new life, but assist the act in having this
result, are morally permissible. How this distinction is to be applied to
such procedures as Gamete Interfallopian Transfer (GIFT), or Tubal
Ovum Transfer (TOT) is not addressed in the Instruction and is in dispute
among moralists who accept its teaching.
IV. Acts Judged Morally Impermissible

Experimentation upon the unborn, at any stage of development, is
categorically rejected. "Experimentation", here, refers to nontherapeutic
experimentation, and seems to include any kind of research which has even
slightly adverse effects on the subject. I say "seems", because the
explanation of the distinction between experimentation and research is
perhaps the least perspicuous explanation in the Instruction. The
I nstruction's concern , however, is in no way obscure. No human being is to
be treated as if he / she were a mere means for the satisfaction of the needs
of others. Every person is to be loved and respected for his or her own sake.
Similarly rejected as incompatible with the human dignit y of the unborn
is the production of embryos to be used as experimental materials , or to be
wasted incidentally to in vitro fertilization.
A va riety of other techniques, actual and possible, are also rejected, both
because they fail to respect the personal dignity of the subject, and because
they fail to respect every person's right to be born in and from marriage.
Thus, asexual reproduction, combining human and animal gametes, the
gestation of humans in animal or artificial uteruses , the free z ing of human
embryos, even to save their lives, and non-therapeutic attempts to
influence inheritance are all rejected as immoral. The Instruction's
treatment of these questions is very brief. and wilL no doubt , have to be
spelled out as these procedures become more available.
The freezing of em bryos is already being done, so it is wort h considering
the I nstruction's briefly stated reason for rejecting it. This procedure is
wrong because it exposes the embryo to grave risks of death and bodily
harm as well as placing it in a situation in which further manipulation and
offense is possible. It also deprives the embryo of maternal shelter and
gestation. This account needs amplification. Clearly it shows that it is
absolutely wrong to bring a person into existence with the intention of
freezing him / her. But once the individual is brought into being outside
his / her mother's body, the risk to life and health of not freezing may be as
great as that of freezing, and the mother's womb may be simply
unavailable. Amplification of the argument is needed to show that in this
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situation the threat of future offense and manipulation is sufficient to
absolutely exclude freezing.
The I nstruction's concern that very young and vulnerable individuals
not be put unreasonably at risk, manipulated , abused or "wasted".
underlies its specific judgment on the morality of in vitro fertilization. As
actually practiced, IYF involves all of these harms to the embryo. All of
them are made possible by the fact that the embryo comes to be and lives
for a time outside of his or her mother's body.
But the Instruction's evaluation of IYF and other technological
interventions used to cope with infertility is not based on concerns about
the welfare of the newly conceived individual. Concerns about the
relationship between procreation. marriage and the marital act are also
operative. These two types of concern are closely connected. The Church's
conviction that procreation should take place within marriage is based on
the belief that the family provides the only context within which a child can
come to be and develop in a way compatible with his or her human dignity .
The unity and fidelity of husband and wife are essential for the communion
of the family . and have their special character because of the family's
orientation toward procreation and the nurturing of children. The goods
of marriage, the goods of spouses and their children. are inextricably
woven together. Acts which seek some of these goods outside marriage, or
seek some of them while disregarding others, cannot, in the end, fail to harm
them all. That is at least part of the sense of the principle of the
inseparability of the various meanings of the marital act.
Thus the Instruction rejects all extramarital uses of procedures like IYF
and artificial inseminati'o n, simply because they are extramarital. The
clearest examples of such uses are those in which non-married people use
them to have children outside the context of marriage. The most notorious
are the well known. if misnamed, cases of surrogate motherhood in which
a woman conceives and carries a child for a couple whose husband
provides the sperm. The commonest are those in which sperm is obtained
from a donor for use by way of artificial insemination . A similar situation
would arise if ova were donated for use by way of in vitro fertili7.ation.
The degree and character of t he separation of procreation and marriage
vary considerably among these procedures. But they are all extramarital in
the relevant sense. for even in those cases in which the reproductive
activities take place within the context of marriage. the child does not
come to beFum the marriage. When third parties provide the gametes. it is
impossible to meet what the Instruction regards as a necessary condition
for responsible procreation - that the child be "the fruit and the sign ofthe
mutual self-giving of the spouses, of their love, and of their fidelity"
(Section II. A).
Many balk at this reason. They note that in many cases the use of donor
sperm, for example. is done for the most loving of motives. The very fact
that a couple is willing to undertake such measures shows real love and
self-giving. The Instruction does not deny this. Its point is more precise. It
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is pretense to tell oneself that reproduction using donated gametes is
literally the fru it of a cou pie's marital acts. I tis, st rict Iy spea king, t he res ult
of the technological intervention in which th e donor's gametes arejo ined
to those of one of the spouses .
Many, however, do not see why this s hould be morally objectio nab le.
Why should procreation be so tightly tied to marital intercourse as the
quoted condit ion requires? The Instru ct ion's emphasis on the inseparab ility of the unitive and procreative meanings of the marital act is not
sufficient to answer this question because, in effect, it asks for the rationale
behind this principle's application to reproductive technologies. The
reason seems to lie in a convict ion which is stated in the I nstruction, but
does not emerge as a full-fledged argument - namely , that in reproductive
activities which do not meet its condit ion, the child in its coming-to-be is
treated as an object, a thing and not a person.
The sign and the fruit of an action of mutual self-giving are not products
made, but are a gift and blessing welcomed. By contrast, the results of
productive activities cannot but be regarded as things having a status
inferior to those who make them . The communio n of the family must
a lw ays be a communion among persons, a ll of whose equal personal
dignity is to be respected. It hardly needs saying, th erefore, that the babies
brought into being by procedures rejected by the Instruction are in no way
condemned or disvalued. It is because these procedures require that the
babies be treated in a way incompatible with their true human stat us that
the procedures must be rejected.
The Instruction provides, therefore, a rationale for excluding not only
the separation of procreation from marriage by the use of donor ga metes,
but also the kind of separat ion of procreation from marital intercourse
which occurs even within marriage when the gametes of th e spouses are
joined by technological procedures which replace the marital act. These
activities a re excluded, in other words, not only because in I VF they place
the newly conceived individual at risk, and because in IVF and artificial
insemination using the husband's sperm they involve masturbation to
obtain the sperm, but because they separate procreation from marital
intercourse. The masturbation, as the Instruction observes , is a sign of this
separat ion.

V. Implications of These Judgments for Various Persons
The substa ntive moral judgments of the Instruction have implications
for various persons having diverse responsibilities . The implications for
infertile couples and those who advise and assist them are plain. They may,
of course, seek legitimate therapies to overcome infertility, but they must
recognize that no one has a right to a child. A child is a person, not a thing,
and one cannot have rights to persons. One may desire a child as one
desires a blessing or a gift; one does not have a right to a blessing. Sterility,
therefore, is a cross, often a terrible one, which some people must bear, and
others must help them bear.
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It seems to me that the alternative to this understanding of sterility is to
suppose that couples may do anything to have a child, but the willingness
to do anything to have a child suggests a possessiveness altogether at odds
with the attitude of service required of those who would be good parents.
Supporting possessive desires towards other persons hardly qualifies as
Christian compassion.
The desire of a couple to have children is natural. It can be quite exigent
and can cause terrible suffering if unfulfilled. Yet there is no desire which
an upright person will not carefully scrutinize, particularly when its
fulfillment affects central human relationships. The desire to have children
is, therefore, not beyond moral scrutiny. Indeed , human life abounds with
examples in which it provided unworthy motivation, for example, cases in
which people seek children simply to continue a dynasty or family name,
or cases in which people seek children simply as an insurance policy for old
age. The I nstruction, in effect, asks us to consider the motivations behind
decisions to use artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization , and in
particular, to ask whether the child so desperately wanted is desired simply
to fulfill the couple's emotional needs . If that is why they want a child , then
it is hard to see the difference between wanting a child and wanting a thing
one finds very desirable. But children are not things, and being a parent is
not having possession, but serving life, cooperating with God in a
marvelous activity which is profaned by reduction to the categories of
production and desire satisfaction.
The special implications of the Instruction's judgments for physicians
are closely related: the basis for medical ethics should be service to
people's lives and health, and respect for the values of human sexuality.
Thus, physicians have no business disposing of people, and they should
not take over the reproductive function. Catholic physicians, scientists
and health care facilities should bear witness by carefully 0 bserving the
relevant norms. The Instruction acknowledges the great good which has
been accomplished by scientific and medical efforts to deal with infertility.
Physicians and scientists are urgently requested to continue this work to
find ways of dealing with infertility which are both effective and fully
respectful of the dignity of marriage, of spouses and of their offspring.
The implications of the Instruction's judgments for legislators and civil
authorities are based on the principle that civil law should protect human
rights, in particular the right of every person to life from the moment of
conception, and should protect the family and marriage. Thus, there
should be laws forbidding all killing of innocent human beings, all genesis
of human life in which the materials are not from a married couple,
surrogate motherhood, embryo banks, and post-mortem insemination.
The Instruction does not say that all its moral judgments should be legally
enforced.
The Instruction closes with a plea for further study of the issues it
considers, especially by moralists. This plea is not a suggestion that its
specific conclusions are tentative or revisable, but rather is a recognition of
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how difficult these iss ues are, and how hard it is to adequately understand
them. This reflection is called for because of the importance of correctly
understanding the reasons for and the validity of the Instruction's
teaching. It is to be carried out "in unrenounceable fidelity to the teaching
of the Church".
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